Abstract-k-Anonymity protects privacy by ensuring that data cannot be linked to a single individual. In a k-anonymous data set, any identifying information occurs in at least k tuples. Much research has been done to modify a single-table data set to satisfy anonymity constraints. This paper extends the definitions of k-anonymity to multiple relations and shows that previously proposed methodologies either fail to protect privacy or overly reduce the utility of the data in a multiple relation setting. We also propose two new clustering algorithms to achieve multirelational anonymity. Experiments show the effectiveness of the approach in terms of utility and efficiency.
INTRODUCTION
T HE tension between the value of using personal data for research and concern over individual privacy is ever increasing. Simply removing uniquely identifying information (SSN, name) from data is not sufficient to prevent identification because partially identifying information (quasi-identifiers; age, sex, city . . . ) can still be mapped to individuals using publicly available knowledge [23] . Table 2 shows one such example where an attacker, by using a public data set, can map the names of the students to the sensitive GPA information, even though the released private table does not disclose the names of the students. (For example, a student with age "18," sex "M," and city "Lafayette" has a GPA of "2.34." Luke is the only person with these attributes in the public data set.) k-Anonymity [20] is one technique to protect against the linkage and identification of records. In a k-anonymous table, each distinct tuple in the projection over quasiidentifier attributes occurs at least k times. Private tables are k-anonymized by the use of generalizations and suppressions, with the result having two key properties: 1) In the anonymous data set, an individual can only be linked to a group of at least k private entities. 2) Every tuple of the anonymous data set correctly represents a unique tuple in the private data set (there is no false or noisy information). For example, Table 2 shows a 2-anonymization of the abovementioned private table. Given the 2-anonymized table, an attacker can at best link Luke into GPAs "3.72" and "2.34."
k-Anonymity does not enforce diversity on the sensitive information of equivalence classes (set of tuples with the same identifying attributes in k-anonymous data set). This has lead to extended privacy definitions [8] , [16] , [15] , [18] , [25] . As many of the algorithms for these definitions are rooted in k-anonymization algorithms, the multirelational (multiR) k-anonymity approach presented here can serve as a basis for extending other k-anonymity-based definitions to multiple relations; one such extension is given in Section 5.
In the case where all sensitive attributes in the private table are unique, k-anonymity does ensure that linkage will only be possible to groups of k-distinct sensitive values.
To achieve k-anonymity in single-table data sets, numerous generalization (replacing data values with more general values) and suppression algorithms have been proposed [21] , [9] , [10] , [13] , [3] , [14] , [2] , [6] , [19] . These algorithms assume each private entity is stored as one row in a single attribute-value table. When information about a private entity is contained in multiple tables, and not easily represented in a single table, the existing definitions and algorithms are insufficient. In Section 2, this paper extends the k-anonymity definitions to a multiR setting; Section 3 discusses why multiR k-anonymity is a new problem that is not solved by previous k-anonymity algorithms.
Single dimensional k-anonymity algorithms were designed to specify generalization mappings (or complete suppression of values) for data values in the data set to optimize against a certain metric. Some of such algorithms used pruning methods to reduce the size of the search space for optimal k-anonymity [13] , [3] . However, in a multiR anonymity setting, the search space is much bigger and simple modifications will not be as efficient unless the original optimality is sacrificed by using other assumptions. In [19] , [14] , and [6] , it was shown that although not optimal, a multidimensional approach to k-anonymity can offer more flexibility in anonymizations. Among this family of algorithms, the clustering-based approach is more suitable to the multiR setting due to the ease in explicit identification of the entity being protected (anonymized) in the data set. In Section 4, protected entities and associated relations will be abstracted by trees and a modification of a previously proposed clustering algorithm will be presented to provide multiR anonymity on snowflake schemas; with the aforementioned extension to '-diversity and related approaches in Section 5. Section 6 will present experimental results evaluating the new approach in terms of precision and execution time.
MULTIR ANONYMITY

Definitions and Notations
We now define notations and k-anonymity for the multiR setting. Given a table T , T ½c½r refers to the value of column c, row r of T . T ½c is the projection of column c.
Definition 1 (Person specific table). A table P T is said to be
person specific with respect to some population U if and only if it contains a primary key attribute (or set of attributes) vip such that each value of vip uniquely corresponds to an individual in U.
Definition 2 (MultiR schema).
A set of tables SU and a set of functional dependencies SF corresponds to a multiR schema if SU is a dependency preserving, lossless join decomposition with respect to SF and there exists one person specific table P T 2 SU, where each row corresponds to an individual in population U. We say a database with such a schema has the transcript MRðSF ; U; P T ; ST ; vipÞ, where vip is the unique identifier in P T and ST ¼ SU À fP T g. Table 3 shows an example for a multiR database with transcript MRðSF ; U; T p ; fT 1 ; T 2 g; SidÞ, where SF ¼ fSid ! GPA; SCid ! fSid; Course; Gradegg and U is the set of students. The schema is in BCNF and dependency preserving.
The following quasi-identifier definition is a reformulation of the definition in [22] .
Definition 3 (Quasi-identifier). Let MRðSF ; U; P T ; fT 1 ; . . . ; T n g; vipÞ be a multiR database, and JT ¼ P T ffl Informally, a quasi-identifier for a schema is the set of attributes in JT that can be used to externally link or identify a given tuple in P T . In Table 3 , Course and Book attributes can be considered quasi-identifiers since colleagues of a student may know this information about their friend. The attributes GPA, Grade, and Price are the sensitive attributes of the private entity Sid. An attacker knows the quasi-identifiers about an entity and tries to discover other (sensitive) information in the data. For example, in Table 3 , we assume the attacker knows that some individual George in U takes the courses "History" and "Religion" and uses the textbook "American History" for the "History" course. The attacker wants to discover George's (sensitive) GPA or his grade in the "History" course. If the data are released as it is, even though George's name is hidden, the attacker can easily link George to student S4 and GPA "4.00" or SCid SC10 and grade "98." We also have other join keys in Table 3 like the vip attribute Sid or SCid that are not part of the quasi-identifier set.
For the rest of this paper, we will use the notation given in Table 1 . From now on, if not mentioned otherwise, we will use superscripts to name different multiR databases (e.g., MR 1 ; MR 2 ; . . . ). Superscript for other notations will show membership to the associated multiR database (e.g., vip
1 is the vip of MR 1 ). We will use superscript Ã for multiR anonymizations. Subscripts will distinguish different elements of the same multiR database (e.g., The multiR databases given in Tables 3 and 4 are an example of structural equivalence.
We now define two operators that will be used in the following sections for multiR databases. 
Definition 5 (Union
, and vip
Many different cost metrics were used in the literature [10] , [3] , [19] , [12] to measure utility of anonymized data sets. We redefine two of these cost metrics, LM [10] and DM [3] , for the multiR setting, and use them in our experiments. Different variations that may better fit to relational databases can be formalized. (Discussion on such a formulation is 
LM metric can be defined on individual data cells. It penalizes the value of each data cell in the anonymized data set depending on how general it is (how many leaves are below it on the DGH tree).
.) LM for the multiR data set normalizes the total cost to obtain a number between 0 and 1.
Definition 8 (DM). Let MR
Ã be an anonymization of MR and let G MR Ã ðvpÞ be the set of vip's in MR Ã indistinguishable from a given vip vp 2 MR. Then,
As in the LM metric, the smaller the number returned by the DM metric, the better the anonymization.
Problem Definition
Our objective is to find a k-anonymization of a given multiR database. As the first step, we redefine k-anonymity for the multiR setting. The part "k not necessarily distinct tuples" in requirement 1 can be changed to "k distinct tuples" if we assume all sensitive information in the MR is unique. MR and the k-anonymous MR Ã need not be structurally equivalent; however, we will see that equivalence eases the anonymization process and can improve utility of the data set.
The example in Table 3 is clearly not k-anonymous even Table 4 shows a 2-anonymization of Table 3 using generalizations from the domain generalization hierarchies given in Fig. 1 ; the same query on Table 4 returns no tuples.
The next theorem proves that due to requirement 2, the different sets of vip tuples returned by queries in a given multiR database act like disjoint groups of size at least k, and queries are answered in terms of the groups. This notion of groupings is analogous to equivalence classes in the original k-anonymity definition. The theorem implicitly states that disjoint grouping of vip's is a necessary step for the multiR anonymization process. We make use of this fact in designing multiR algorithms in Sections 3.3 and 4.2. The k-anonymity definition for a multiR database is not arbitrary. If an attacker faces the same set of private entities in every possible set of queries, it can only map its external knowledge to that set. Requirement 3 for k-anonymity prevents false information being included in the anonymization of the original database. (Otherwise, there would be trivial solutions for k-anonymization such as replication of tuples. This requirement holds also for classical, single-table k-anonymity, although it was not included explicitly in its definition.) Note that the definitions and concepts given here subsume the definitions of single-table k-anonymity. In classical k-anonymity, we have one private table P T ðA 1 ; . . . ; A n Þ without any dependencies corresponding to a population U. Since every tuple in P T belongs to an individual, we can add a unique identifier attribute to P T to form P T p ðA u ; A 1 ; . . . ; A n Þ. P T p becomes a person specific table with vip attribute A u . In that case, an anonymization for MRðfA u ! fA 1 ; . . . ; A n gg; U; P T p ; fg; A u Þ is also an anonymization for P T in terms of classical k-anonymity definitions.
SINGLE-TABLE ALGORITHMS FOR MULTIR ANONYMITY
We now explore some obvious approaches to achieving multiR anonymity using single-table k-anonymity algorithms. The main idea is to convert the multiR database into one or more single tables and anonymize these. For each approach, we describe why it does not give satisfactory results; the insights are useful in understanding the algorithm we will give in Section 4.
Universal Anonymization
One solution might be to construct the universal relation from the multiR database and run a single-table anonymization algorithm on this relation. Table JT in Table 5 shows the universal table for the database MRðSF ; U; T p ; fT 1 g; SidÞ.
(The attribute SCid is removed, but this does not affect the discussion.) To run an anonymity algorithm, we need to identify the attributes that need to be modified. We have two choices at this point. The first approach is to modify only the quasi-identifier attributes (attribute Course in JT ) leaving the others untouched. Data set AT 1 in Table 5 is one possible 2-anonymization of JT . However, we see that AT 1 obviously does not provide anonymity when an attacker knows all or some of the courses taken by a student. For example, if an attacker knows that Chris is taking History, Math, and Physics, then it will map Chris to S1 since S1 is the only one taking two science courses and a history course. A second approach would be to modify join keys (NDGH generalizations [19] ) along with the quasi-identifiers (e.g., attributes Course and Sid in JT ). Data set AT 2 in Table 5 is such a 2-anonymization of JT but still fails to satisfy privacy constraints.
The main reason anonymization of a universal relation fails is that multiple tuples belong to a single person and the anonymization process does not take this into account. It becomes possible that tuples belonging to the same entity are anonymized with each other, making the relation "k-anonymous" but failing to protect individual identity. One way of resolving this would be to suppress all the data in the joining attributes (e.g., Sid). However, in that case, the data set would lose its relational structure and the valuable information in the 1-N or N-N relations (e.g., the information that a student taking Math, Physics, and History has GPA 3.72 would be lost). This universal approach also suffers from inference channels due to the redundancy in representation when the adversary knows functional dependencies for the schema, e.g., in AT 2 , given Sid ! GP A holds, the attacker will discover the third tuple is actually Sid S1 since the first two tuples imply the student with GPA 2.71 is S1. A related work [27] worth mentioning here was on checking k-anonymity on views over a universal data set. The work was not based on table generalizations and did not propose a k-anonymization algorithm to create anonymous views.
Local Anonymization
Another way to anonymize the data set would be to k-anonymize each table independently. The most basic way of doing that is shown in T Table 6 . This set of tables suffers from the same problems mentioned in Section 3.1 (e.g., disclosure of Chris's GPA).
A second approach again would be to use NDGH generalizations on non-QI join keys as shown in T In this case, for this particular MR database, GPA information seems to be 2-anonymous. However, sensitive Grade information is not protected. The attacker will still be able to map S1 to Chris and learn that he has received "93" and "91" in two science courses (although not which course each score belongs to). This is a violation of anonymity requirement 2, since Chris is not anonymous with respect to another student. Another downside of the approach is that modifying join keys introduces many incorrect join paths, decreasing the usability of the data.
The main reason why local anonymizations fail is that use of independent and arbitrary mappings for generalization of one table can create inference channels with respect to mappings used by other tables. A multiR anonymity algorithm should use consistent mappings throughout data sets (e.g., by Theorem 1; if S1 and S2 are anonymized with each other in one table, their courses should also be anonymized with each other in the other table). Tables T   2  p and T 3 1 show a valid 2-anonymization that enforces consistent mapping. Anonymization should also decide which mapping to use for anonymization. Clearly, a multiR anonymity algorithm needs to view data globally to come up with close mappings between private entities while maintaining precision and usefulness of the output data. The multiR anonymity algorithm given in Section 4 will take all these observations into account and give global decisions for anonymization mappings.
Bitmap Anonymization
Some multiR databases can be converted to a Boolean vector "bitmap" format with every private entity as a single row and distinct attributes used to reflect different values.
Bitmap conversion is done by assigning the value "1" for attributes that the private entity possess in the MR database. Handling the other attributes that the entity does not possess is done differently for different types of MR databases. In complete databases, nonexisting tuples in the db (negative tuples) implies that the individual does not possess the corresponding attribute. Thus, nonexistent tuples also constitute in the information content of the database (e.g., University Registration Database, Voters Database, . . . . In T 1 in Table 3 , S1 taking "Religion" course is missing implying Chris definitely did not take the "Religion" course). In bitmap versions of complete databases, "0" is used for nonexistent attributes of the entities. On the other hand, in incomplete databases, negative tuples imply uncertainty and they do not add into the information content (e.g., hospital databases, business databases that share customers,. . . . Having a patient not having a particular disease in a hospital database does not necessarily imply that patient did not have the disease. It is always possible that full records of a patient are contained in multiple hospitals). In bitmap versions of incomplete databases, value " Ã " is used for nonexistent attributes of the entities to express uncertainty. Table 7 shows the bitmap version of the complete MR database given in Table 3 and its 2-anonymization. Classical k-anonymity algorithms can be run on such data sets. The anonymized data will then satisfy both multiR anonymity requirements for certain types of relations; however,
not every multiR database is bitmap convertible.
Schemas containing tables that map one entity to another entity an arbitrary number of times cannot be converted to bitmap format without information loss (e.g., a student taking n different Physics classes, where n is arbitrarily large, cannot be readily expressed. This is a serious drawback for data sets that are updated frequently. Updates on certain individuals can trigger changes in the schema of the anonymized data set). 2. For incomplete databases, anonymization would only be through suppression, as generalizing "S1 is taking a Math course and S2 is taking a CS course" into "S1 and S2 are both taking a Science course" would correspond to merging columns in the schema rather than generalization of data. So, anonymizations cannot take advantage of user-supplied generalization hierarchies or total ordering assumptions for the attribute domains (for the sake of both utilization and incorporating domain knowledge). 3. For complete databases, anonymizations would additionally preserve common negative information (e.g., "S3 is not taking a CS course and S4 is not taking a CS course," anonymization would preserve "neither S3 nor S4 is taking a CS course"). However, it is still impossible to incorporate domain knowledge through generalization hierarchies or total ordering assumptions (e.g., generalizing a student taking "CS" with another student taking "Math" is as costly as generalizing two students taking "CS"
and "Religion", respectively, even though the former could be a better generalization). 4. Suppression in the bitmap setting removes certainty about the number of tuples corresponding to a given entity (e.g., "S1 is taking a Math course and S2 is taking a CS course" could safely be generalized into "S1 and S2 are both taking at least one ("Science") course." Bitmap anonymization would imply "S1 and S2 are taking two courses in total"). 5. Bitmap anonymizations do not consider possible similarities of two private entities in the tail of a nested relation. (For example, in the multiR database in Table 3 , S1 is taking a Math course and buys the Discrete book for the course and S2 is taking a CS course and buys the same book. Given that course information is generalized (or suppressed), the book information can safely be preserved without violating privacy. Bitmap anonymization would not retain only the book information.) 6. Conversion to bitmap format produces data sets of high dimensionality. Since distribution of produced data points are skewed over the whole possible space, this does not introduce further problems regarding the curse of dimensionality. However, k-anonymity algorithms do not take into account the existence of "invalid points" (e.g., a point with Math-T:0, MathDi:1 would be an invalid point implying that the student has not taken "Math" but used the "Discrete" book for the "Math" course). Heuristics would need to be used that would ignore invalid points to speed up the anonymization. 7. Most real-world data are stored as relational tables rather than bitmap tables. Conversion to such a bitmap costs additional execution time and storage, not to mention the cost of converting applications designed for the original schema. 8. Many real-world relational databases contain correlations within relations and this may make certain heuristics for improving efficiency possible (e.g., a student taking a "science" course is more likely to buy a "science" or "math" book than a "religion" book. It is possible to design fast and reasonably precise algorithms that decide anonymizations only on courses without considering book information). It may be difficult to exploit such correlations without considering the structure of the data. A single-table k-anonymity algorithm on a bitmap database will be This reduces the information loss in the anonymization to some degree.
unaware of the underlying structure and thus the correlation.
CLUSTERING-BASED MULTIR ANONYMITY
We now develop a multiR anonymity algorithm that overcomes the shortcomings of the approaches described in the previous section, although it places certain (reasonable) restrictions on the schemas supported. Algorithms for arbitrary schemas are left as future work.
Assumptions and Properties
We aim to preserve certain properties of the database and, in doing so, accept certain limitations on the databases that can be anonymized by our algorithm. These properties and assumptions are given here. Schema preservation. The schemas of the input database MR and the k-anonymous output MR Ã will be structurally equivalent (Definition 4).
Dependency preservation. The anonymized database preserves functional dependencies of the original database, so that 1. the semantics of the data are better preserved, and 2. inference attacks, by an adversary who knows a functional dependency that fails to hold in the anonymized data, are prevented. We require that the schema be normalized to enforce dependencies; this obviates the need to provide dependencies separately as input to the anonymization algorithm.
Snowflake schema. The algorithm we present is limited to schemas satisfying the following constraints:
1. No connection keys (primary/foreign keys) between tables in MR are quasi-identifiers. (It is possible to replace such quasi-identifiers with nonidentifying keys to preserve connections.) 2. Every table in ST contains only one foreign key. Table P T does not contain a foreign key. 3. We say a table T 2 belongs to the family of T 1 and write T 2 2 F ðT 1 Þ if T 2 has a foreign key attribute, which is a primary key attribute either in T 1 or in another family member of T 1 . We restrict ourselves to schemas with F ðP T Þ ¼ ST . Schemas with these constraints are similar to snowflake relations where the fact table is the table P T (see Fig. 2 ), although we do support one to many relationships between P T and other tables. Any table in the schema can contain sensitive attributes; anonymity constraint 1 will hold for all of them. This family of schemas is expressive enough for many database applications (XML, some spatiotemporal databases, data warehouses, . . . ).
Join key atomicity. The algorithm presented in the next section will preserve the atomicity of join keys. (The assumption that join keys are not quasi-identifiers makes it possible to follow this approach in all cases.) This ensures one true join path as opposed to multiple paths (as in fT Table 6 ) in each connection and improves utility of the anonymization (a query on the anonymized data set is "true," in the sense that the result is a generalization of the result on the underlying data set).
MultIRelAtional CLustEring (MiRaCle) Anonymization Algorithm
We now present a MiRaCle anonymization algorithm that anonymizes a given multiR database under the assumptions given in the previous section. We first give a higher level description of the algorithm to make the formal explanation easy to follow.
Informal Description
MiRaCle is a clustering-based anonymity algorithm; any distance-based clustering k-anonymity algorithm [6] , [19] , [1] can be used as a basic skeleton for MiRaCle anonymizations. The main observation is that all clustering-based anonymity algorithms make use of two basic operations on private entities: anonymization and calculation of the distance between two entities. The latter can be generally defined as the cost of the anonymization of two entities. As a sample basic skeleton, in the next section, we present a trivial modification of CDGH clustering algorithm [19] for MiRaCle. Here, we turn our attention to the real question: How we anonymize two entities?
The assumptions given in the previous section enables us to abstract entities of multiR databases as trees, where each level of a given entity tree corresponds to levels of the nested relation for a particular vip entity. (Fig. 3 gives an example.) The challenge is to anonymize two trees of similar structure with respect to each other. Fig. 3 , children of S1 and S2: C 1 ¼f''Math;'' ''Physics;'' ''History''g, C 2 ¼ f''CS;'' ''Physics;'' ''Religion''g.) The algorithm chooses pairings of nodes between these sets to minimize the local cost in the current level or the overall cost of the anonymized trees. In Fig. 3 , "Math" is paired with "CS," "Physics" with "Physics," and "History" with "Religion," producing the set of nodes {"Science," "Physics," "Social", which is the least costly set in terms of the cost metric used (e.g., LM), since each pair is composed of two trees to be anonymized and the function is called on the subtrees. (In Fig. 3 , a second call is made on ðtreeð''Math''Þ; treeð''CS''Þ.) "Math" and "CS" values are changed to "Science" as a result of the second call. Unpaired nodes are suppressed (e.g., node "Calc").
Formal Description
We first show in Algorithm 2 how to modify the CDGH clustering algorithm [19] to anonymize a given multiR database. Each cluster has a representative that holds the anonymization of the entities it contains. For each vip value v, the algorithm finds, in line 5, a suitable cluster to put v into. Suitability is measured by a distance function dist, which we will define shortly. If there is no suitable cluster, in line 7, v defines a new one. Then, in line 9, the cluster representative of the closest cluster is updated to be the anonymization of v and the former representative by calling the function anon. When a cluster is full, the identifying information in the tuples in the cluster (including tuples linked to in other tables) is replaced with the cluster representative; these generalized tuples are placed into the anonymized database and the cluster is deleted. In lines 13-20, leftover clusters are combined. Leftover tuples in the last cluster ð< kÞ are suppressed. 
go to step 2 to process the next vip in MR 9:
MR ci ¼ anonðv ci ; v j ; MR ci ; MRÞ. 10:
if the number of elements in c i becomes more than k then 12: 
if the number of elements in c i becomes more than k then 18:
go to line 14 to find another suitable j.
21: MR
Ã now contains only one vip v i data for each equivalence class, add the anonymizations for other vip's by using EC c j sets created in the process. 22: suppress the remaining vip's in C and add to MR Ã 23: return MR Ã As also mentioned in the previous section, the real challenge is to define the distance between the two points (e.g., private entities such as students). If we know how to produce anonymizations of two points with respect to each other, we can derive the distance between them by calculating the cost of their anonymization with respect to any precision/cost metric. Here are formal details regarding how MiRaCle defines the anonymization and distance functions between two private entities (vip's) v 1 2 MR 1 and v 2 2 MR 2 : Fig. 3 . Anonymization of students S1 and S2 from the sample MR database in Table 3 . if att i is a QI attribute then {Just anonymize} 5:
if att i is a non-QI nonkey or a foreign key then {Copy} 7:
if att i is a primary key for a join with another table then {Ensure anonymized across join} 9:
for all pairs of tables i , e.g., Fig. 3 .) The function classifies and processes each attribute one by one. Processing of primary key attributes is important since they serve as connections to other tables. Attribute evaluation can be summarized as follows:
. Lines 4-7: for nonkey attributes and foreign key attributes, behave as in single- The algorithm can use any incremental cost metric that can be defined on a database. For the experiments, we will use the LM metric defined in Section 2. Table 4 shows the output of MiRaCle on the MR input given in Table 3 for k ¼ 2. vip S1 and S2 and vip S3 and S4 anonymized with each other. Fig. 3 shows how S1 and S2 are anonymized. The algorithm first ensures the tuples are anonymous with respect to QI attributes. Since T p does not contain any QI attributes, no change is done (the root nodes in Fig. 3) . However, the primary key of T p , Sid, occurs in T 1 as a foreign key, so algorithm AnonymizeSets is called on the sets of tuples sid¼''S1 00 T 1 and sid¼''S2 00 T 1 (the nodes on the second level of the trees). A one-to-one matching of tuples is done according to how costly the anonymization of the matched tuples will be. Anonymization in this level also takes into account table T 2 (Books table), since T 2 and T 1 share SCid as a joining key. First, the "Math" node is matched with the "CS" node since they can be anonymized as "Science" and they have a common node in the third level (in table T 2 ). The "Physics" node is matched with "Physics," the anonymization here triggers a call of AnonymizeSets on the sets of nodes {"Calc," "Dyn"} and {"Dyn"}. Node "Dyn" is matched with node "Dyn." No match is found for the node "Calc" so it is suppressed. The last nodes in the second level are anonymized similarly.
If we take the function gen as the basic operation, function anonymize (and thus the algorithm MiRaCle) turns out to be expensive. Assuming n ¼ jC 1 j ¼ jC 2 j, for every call to anonymizeSetsðC 1 ; C 2 ; Á; ÁÞ, Oðn 2 Þ generalizations are performed. Note that the anonymize function (thus, function anonymizeSets) is recursively called for every level in the relation (roughly speaking for every table in the MR database). Given that we have ' levels (tables) in MR, the complexity function is defined as fð'Þ ¼ n 2 Á fð' À 1Þ. This gives us a complexity of Oðn 2' Þ for function anonymize. So, MiRaCle is an Oðclimit Á jMRj Á n 2' Þ algorithm. In the worst case, n ¼ jC 1 j ¼ jC 2 j can be as large as half of the size of the first table connected (e.g., T 1 in Table 3 ). This happens when we have two vip's each connected to exactly half of the tuples in the first table. However, in practice, n is a small and generally bounded number (e.g., the maximum number of courses that can be taken by a student is bounded by the number of available courses and the work hours).
MiRaCle Extension: MiRaCleX
As mentioned in the previous sections, a multiR anonymization algorithm can make use of the relational structure of the database to come up with more efficient heuristics. We present one example of such a heuristic in this section.
The MiRaCle anonymization process given in Section 4.2.2 considers the whole sibling subtrees when deciding on a suitable matching of sibling nodes (in other words, subtree matching is done rather than node matching). This is an effective way of achieving an anonymization with maximum precision. However, it is costly in terms of execution time since the Anonymize function has to be called for each potentially matched subtree pair (even for pairs that are not matched at the end of the anonymization process).
MiRaCle extension (MiRaCleX) makes use of the following observation: If QI values for two root nodes are similar, then QI values for their children are likely to be similar too. (If two students are both taking "Math" course, it is probable that they are both using a "Math" book.) This observation can be generalized for most relational databases. (The tail of the relations is correlated with the root of the relation.) An algorithm may produce anonymizations with reasonable precision much faster by just looking at the QI attribute similarities of the upper level nodes of the relation and not considering lower level nodes. Given this, pairing of sibling nodes in the AnonymizeSets function of MiRaCleX can be rewritten as in Algorithm 5. By this, the recursive call to the Anonymize function is moved outside of the innermost loop and the complexity function for function anonymize becomes fð'Þ ¼ n Á fð' À 1Þ þ n 2 . This gives us a complexity of Oðn 'þ1 Þ for function anonymize. So, MiRaCleX is an Oðclimit Á jMRj Á n 'þ1 Þ algorithm. In Fig. 3 , to find a matching between {"Math," "Physics 1 ," "History"} and {"CS," "Physics 2 ," "Religion"} in the second level, MiRaCleX Anonymize function only considers QI attributes in the Course table T 1 , ignoring information in the Books table T 2 . Once matching is done on the second level (e.g., "Physics 1 " to "Physics 2 "), QI attributes in the Books table specify the matching on the third level (e.g., a matching between {"Calc," "Dyn"} and {"Dyn"}).
The complexity of MiRaCleX can further be reduced by using other heuristics. As an example, if the height of DGH trees is smaller than n, the matching of tuples in AnonymizeSetsX can be made more efficiently. Instead of trying all possible pairings, level-by-level full-domain generalization can be applied to each tuple in C 1 and C 2 and tuples with the same values are processed as matched tuples [21] . Such an approach would result in a complexity 
13: suppress rest of the tuples in C 2 and add them to P T 
Proof of k-Anonymity for MiRaCle Anonymization Algorithm
Now, we prove that MiRaCle produces k-anonymous databases. 2 Since the algorithm preserves the structure of the data and all changes are based on either generalizations or suppressions, the third requirement for k-anonymity trivially holds. The following theorems prove the first requirement (sensitive information protection). The proof for the second requirement is similar. Since k-anonymity ensures total protection against sensitive information disclosure only when sensitive information is unique for every tuple, throughout the proof, we assume such constraint is enforced in the data set and prove sensitive information is k-anonymous in the output data set. We assume the schemas satisfy the assumptions given in Section 4.1.
We start by showing that anonymization of two private entities is correctly carried out by the function Anonymize. The function Anonymize given in Algorithm 3 produces one representation of the anonymization as opposed to multiple copies of it. For each equivalence class, copies are produced from the representation at the end of MiRaCle given in Algorithm 2. It is trivial to modify the function Anonymize to output the necessary copies. The proofs below will assume copies exist in the Anonymize output. Since the algorithm structure is recursive, we first prove the base case. Proof. Since there are no tables connected to P T i , Anonymize only applies basic generalizations to QI attributes of t i as in the single-table k-anonymization process. This ensures each QI in the two anonymized tuples is the same. Therefore, any subset of the QI occurs in at least two tuples; with no links to other tables, 2-anonymity holds.
t u
We now prove, in a bottom-up fashion, the recursive step to prove that k-anonymity property is propagated through connected tables: If we take a set of k-anonymous databases and add another k-anonymous table where the join keys for each set of private entities join (only) with an equivalence class in the table, and vice versa, then the combined set of tables is k-anonymous. As an example for Lemma 3, in Fig. 3 , p ¼ S1, and one MR a is the two generalization trees with s ¼ 93, 78, respectively, and both rooted from "Science" node with EC T p ðS1Þ ¼ EC MR a ðS1Þ ¼ fS1; S2g. As S1 is connected to one tree, S2 is connected to the other. This is true for all other MR a 's: two MR dbs rooted from "Physics" and "Social" nodes, respectively. It is impossible to distinguish S1 from S2 by using only QI attributes Proof. The skeleton of MiRaCle is a clustering-based k-anonymity algorithm. The only change MiRaCle introduces is to call Anonymizeð vip 1 ¼v1 P T 1 ; vip 2 ¼v2 P T 2 ; MR 1 ; MR 2 Þ lines 9 and 15 for the anonymization of two private trees rooted at v 1 and v 2 . Here, each private tree is actually a cluster representative for multiple trees. Nodes in each representative tree may have values from higher domains in the given dgh structure (values such as "Science," "Social"). However, such difference does not have any effect on the execution of the anonymize function since the generalization function gen is also well defined on higher domains ðgenð''Science;'' ''Math''Þ ¼ ''Science''Þ. The MR Ã database returned by the anonymization function will still be anonymous with respect to both trees. Specifically, if v 1 2 MR 1 and v 2 2 MR 2 are m and n anonymous vip representations, respectively, then v 3 2 MR Ã ¼ anonymizeðv 1 ; v 2 ; MR 1 ; MR 2 Þ is an m þ n anonymous representation. At the end of the MiRaCle algorithm, every cluster C has more than k elements and the associated cluster representative v C is a jCj-anonymous representative. v C for each C is reproduced for every entity within C (so that they form an equivalence class). This ensures k-anonymity. So, Theorem 4 also implies the correctness of Theorem 5. t u
MIRACLE FOR ENFORCING DIVERSITY
Many extensions to k-anonymity have been proposed to deal with a potential disclosure problem in the basic definition: what if all individuals in a k-anonymized group have the same value for a sensitive attribute [8] , [16] , [25] , [28] , [15] , [18] ? We now briefly discuss how to extend the multiR definition to diversity-enforcing definitions. While we specifically address '-diversity [16] , the discussion applies to all of cited definitions except -presence [18] ; it does not have a direct root in k-anonymity, and enforcing -presence with a clustering-based anonymization algorithm is a challenge left as future work.
Diversity-Enforcing MultiR Anonymization
As mentioned before, k-anonymity does not enforce any constraint on the sensitive attributes within an equivalence class. It has been shown that lack of diversity in sensitive attributes makes linking attacks possible even though the k-anonymity property is satisfied. Such issues have been addressed with alternative privacy definitions [8] , [15] , [16] . In these works, the k constraint on the equality group size is replaced or supplemented with a constraint on the distribution of the sensitive values within a group. Without loss of generality, we stick to the '-diversity definition: a set of sensitive values is '-diverse if the entropy of the set is more than logð'Þ. We present an analogous multiR anonymity definition that enforce '-diversity on the sensitive attributes.
Definition 10 ('-diversity for multiR databases). Let MR and MR Ã be two multiR databases with the same set of QI Q MR and set of sensitive attributes S MR . We say MR Ã is an '-diverse anonymization of MR if and only if 8vðJT Ã Þ (views on JT Ã ) the following properties hold:
1. diverse with respect to sensitive attributes: the result set of any query of the type Å att ðvðJT Ã ÞÞ with att 2 S MR respects '-diversity and 2. correct: tuples in JT and JT Ã can be ordered such that for all possible j, JT Ã ½att½j is equal to or some generalization of JT ½att½j if att 2 Q MR and JT Ã ½att½j is equal to JT ½att½j if att 2 S MR .
Anatomization [25] , [28] is an alternative privacy preserving technique to anonymization. The work in [25] groups tuples by using an '-diversity algorithm and creates (quasi-identifier preserving) anatomizations by binding the sensitive values to groups instead of tuples. MultiR anatomization can be produced from '-diverse multiR anonymizations by using the same methodology.
We next show how to create '-diverse multiR anonymizations.
courses and books to students was designed to match Bilkent University's undergraduate program requirements. We ran MiRaCle and MiRaCleX on the original database and the CDGH anonymization algorithm [19] on a bitmap transformation of the database. We fixed the cluster limit to be 150. To evaluate the utility of the anonymizations, we used the adaptations of the LM and DM cost metrics defined in Section 2.
To observe how MiRaCle and MiRaCleX algorithms address weaknesses given in items 2 and 5 of Section 3.3, we first assumed that the data set is incomplete as described in Section 3.3. In Fig. 4a , we graph the change in LM costs of three anonymizations with respect to different k. Both MiRaCle and MiRaCleX are 30-40 percent less costly than the bitmap algorithm. Fig. 4b supports the same relation for a fixed k ¼ 50 but with varying threshold (clustering input parameter). Fig. 4c shows the DM costs for the algorithms. MiRaCle and MiRaCleX slightly outperform the bitmap algorithm on the DM metric.
We next conducted experiments assuming that the data set is complete. LM is not a suitable metric for comparison here since it does not take into account tuples that are not in the data set. Fig. 5 shows the DM cost results. We see that all three algorithms have similar costs and there is no obvious winner. The MiRaCle algorithm loses its flexibility advantage discussed in item 3 of Section 3.3. This is due to the fact that entity anonymizations of MiRaCle are not optimal, which means there are cases where bitmap approach is better with respect to precision. However, in Fig. 6 , we plot the execution time required to run both algorithms on a 1.66-GHz Intel Core Duo machine. Consistent with the discussion in items 6 and 8 of Section 3.3, MiRaCleX outperforms both algorithms by a factor of at least 3. (This is true even though we ignored the time spent to convert the data set to the bitmap format for bitmap anonymizations.) It should be noted that execution times in all conducted experiments show similar behavior. One important observation here is that MiRaCleX has better or comparable utilization when compared to MiRaCle and bitmap algorithms in all of the experiments; however, MiRaCleX is much faster than both algorithms. This implies that underlying heuristic works for the experimental data set.
CONCLUSIONS
We have shown that in a full database setting, single-table k-anonymity algorithms either fail to protect privacy or overly reduce the utility of the data. We proposed a more flexible anonymity algorithm for snowflake schemas. Support for arbitrary schemas with multiple private entities remains as future work.
Besides those mentioned in previous sections, there has been other work on k-anonymization of data sets: With regard to privacy problems related to k-anonymity, the works in [8] and [16] pointed out possible sensitive information disclosure due to lack of diversity on class values of equivalence classes and privacy was further enhanced by enforcing diversity on the class values. The work in [15] mentioned that privacy provided in equivalence classes should be measured in terms of deviation from original distribution of class values and enforced diversity on class values relative to their original distribution in the original data set. The work in [25] pointed out that if the sole purpose for anonymization is to protect against sensitive information disclosure, maximum utilization can be achieved by applying permutations on the sensitive values instead of quasi-identifiers. The work in [18] presented a risk-based privacy notion, where risk is from disclosing the existence of individuals in released data sets.
In [11] and [29] , anonymity was achieved in a distributed system by the use of secure multiparty computations. In [26] , privacy requirements for anonymizations were personalized based on individuals' preferences on sensitive attributes. With regard to utilization of anonymized data sets, in [2] , an application-specific single dimensional k-anonymity algorithm was proposed that makes use of heuristics regarding information gain to optimize the output for classification. The work in [12] discussed releasing marginal count tables along with anonymizations to increase utilization without violating k-anonymity privacy constraints. The work in [24] showed that optimality with respect to a cost metric can be exploited to recover sensitive attributes from an anatomization. And recently, there has been several works on modeling adversary background knowledge in a variety of privacy settings [17] , [5] , [7] .
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